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DEFINLANDIZATION AND THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY OF UKRAINE IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

Purpose. To investigate the genesis and key historical aspects that have led to the popularization of the concept of “definlandization” in scientific literature, as well as the strategic priorities of the formation of the Marshall Plan within the framework of a possible military and economic union between Great Britain, Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic countries. To propose optimal ways of neutralizing economic threats and to determine probable scenarios of the post-war reconstruction of the infrastructure of the national economy of Ukraine.

Methodology. The article uses a combination of correlation and SWOT analysis, which made it possible to calculate the value of natural wealth in the post-war period based on SPSS Data Analysis Software. The used economic-mathematical methods made it possible to form an algorithm for calculating the cost of restoring Ukraine’s total resource losses from Russian aggression in monetary terms and to establish mutually unambiguous correlations with the value of gold using Pearson criterion.

Findings. The authors’ spectrum of factors influencing the New Economic Policy in the post-war period has been systemized to determine the estimated amount of necessary resources for the post-war restart of the national economy of Ukraine. For the first time, the need to abandon the Finlandization policy has been scientifically proven, as domestic resources and funds from reparations will not be sufficient for the sustainable development of Ukraine. It was established that the main guarantee of investing in the Ukrainian economy is the high value of natural resources in all regions of Ukraine, which is estimated in monetary terms at approximately 4 trillion hryvnias and the innovative architecture for the “Marshall Plan” of the post-war reconstruction of the infrastructure of Ukraine is given.

Originality. The used analytical-mathematical methods made it possible to establish correlations in the regional distribution of the value of natural wealth. In contrast to existing studies, this article not only objectively determined the number of losses in monetary terms but also proposed specific ways of their compensation in the context of the formation of a new economic policy of definlandization of Ukraine on the basis of economic and mathematical modelling of a typical scenario of recovery of the national economy.

Practical value. The conducted study on potential ways of definlandization of the national economy was provided for study at the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2022, Lugano, Switzerland). In particular, the authors of the report justified the economic feasibility of moving European production facilities (Robert Bosch GmbH, Siemens, Schneider Electric, SKF, Renault, BMW Group, Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen, Volvo Group, etc.) from the territory of the Russian Federation, which would facilitate the remigration of Ukrainians and accelerated development of Ukraine based on the principles of decentralization, subsidiarity and definlandization.

Keywords: *definlandization, martial law in Ukraine, post-war consequences, economic valuation of losses, new economic policy*

Problem-solving. The beginning of war of the Russian Federation against the sovereign Ukraine began with the seizure of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and significant territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014. In violation of the Budapest Memorandum, the Russian leadership provoked an informal armed conflict between self-proclaimed non-state entities of Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republic (LNR and DNR) and the regular armed forces of Ukraine.

As a result, on February 24, 2022, the classical Northern institutional transition from informal confrontation (antiterrorist operation) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with organized crime (LNR and DNR) to the traditional war between the regular armed forces of the Russian Federation against sovereign Ukraine took place. Russia is trying to repeat the known scheme of Finland (the term used by the German political scientist R. Levental in 1961 after the Berlin crisis, when Finland fell under the Soviet Union) [1], limiting Ukraine’s entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as cynically violating the Memorandum on Security Guarantees in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum), which clearly states that the Russian Federation must be committed to ensuring the territorial in-

tegrity and political independence of Ukraine, and “... that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine” [2].

Thus, the key goal of this article is to find optimal ways to neutralize threats to the national economy and statehood of Ukraine in the following security directions: 1) substantiating the feasibility of definlandization of Ukraine’s foreign policy; 2) outlining the strategic priorities of the formation of a new economic policy for the first five years of the post-war period. The task of the study is also the formation of an algorithm for improving the state economic and foreign economic policy, which would have a positive synergistic effect and contribute to the long-term sustainable development of Ukraine.

Literature review. Scientists who studied the processes of Finlandization and their socio-economic consequences in the context of relations between Finland and other countries (in particular, the USSR in the period 1944–1989) include the works by W. Laqueur (1980), Ruotsila M. [3] and M. Uutela, who predicted: “... Finland’s position in the late 1980s as the Soviet bloc started eroding” [4]. From a scientific point of view, the issues of forming strategic orientations of economic policy are revealed in the article by E. Berndtson, where it is indicated that in the 1990s the old rules and beliefs that governed international relations were destroyed and it is correctly predicted that the internal development of the former European socialist societies is not yet complete, and the North-South and West-East conflict will intensify, in particular in the context of clari-

ifying the relations between “big” and “small” nations, which will still threaten the stability of the modern world [5].

However, the war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine had a significant impact not only on scientific approaches to the formation of a theoretical basis for further development of the national economy but also on the formation of new state-management vectors of economic development in the post-war period.

The **purpose** is to assess Ukraine’s losses from Russian military aggression, based on the systemic analysis, as well as to conduct economic and mathematical modelling of a typical scenario of the recovery of the national economy of Ukraine in the context of its defindlandization.

Results. One of the first scientists who studied the repressive methods of influence of states with a powerful army and significant economic potential on weaker neighbouring states was the German political scientist R. Leventhal, who, using the example of relations between Finland and the USSR after the Second World War, during 1944–1989, singled out significant restrictions on Finland’s state independence, which were imposed on it by its weaker neighbour, the USSR, in a unneighbourly manner. As an example, it is worth citing the fact that the leadership of the USSR controlled the appointment of the highest officials of Finland, who were supposed to maintain neutrality (non-aligned status of NATO) and adhere to the orientation of trade cooperation with the USSR, etc. This policy was supported by the Presidents of Finland, J. Paasikivi and U. Kekkonen, who restrained Finland’s European integration, and as a result, only in 1986, under their leadership, did the country acquire full membership in the European Economic Community, and only in the fourth year after the collapse of the USSR did the Finns succeed in achieving membership in the European Union through a referendum (details in [1]). That is why, in the scientific and political space, the term Finlandization implies the restriction of the right of the country to which this term is applied to self-determination in foreign policy activities by another country that has a more powerful economy or army.

The above-mentioned retrospective analysis indicates that in modern conditions, the leadership of the Russian Federation is trying to forcefully incline (change) the President of Ukraine to the “friendly doctrine of Paasikivi-Kekkonen” and use the proceeds of Finlandization, which in different years the USSR tried to apply to Austria, Poland, Germany and other countries. In particular, the danger of “Finlandization” for a long time stopped the unification of post-war Germany, which was divided as a result of the Second World War into the FRG and the GDR, and only the fact of realizing the inevitability of the collapse of the USSR enabled the unification of East and West Germany into a single state at the end of 1990.

Therefore, the presented historical excursion, the actual military actions of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2022, as well as the systematic analysis of the consequences of Finlandization of other countries that did not become members of NATO or the European Union (EU) allow us to refute the conclusions of Russian scientists, in particular, N. Vezhlytseva, that “...in the case of joining the North Atlantic Alliance, not only Finnish sovereignty will be significantly limited, but also the country’s dependence on external players will increase, to the detriment of its national interests. The military non-alignment of Finland cannot be considered as a continuation of “Finlandization”, which loses its relevance due to the change in the international situation” [6].

Moreover, in the context of the further sustainable development of Ukraine, it is worth introducing a new concept of “defindlandization” into scientific circulation, which will determine the country’s internal force resistance, in particular, military, cultural, educational, psychological, etc., to the actions of the aggressor country, which is built on the protection of democratic European values (Table 1).

Thus, as a result of such a movement, the country will join, under accelerated special procedures, the unification with the

progressive democratic union, which includes countries with equal rights, and therefore it is possible to form hypothesis H1, that it is worth speeding up the adoption of the Association Agreement, which was planned to be ratified in 2024, implementing about 70 % of EU rights. As of January 26, 2022, according to the CMU, the Agreement has been implemented by 63 %, taking into account Ukraine’s compliance with the “Copenhagen criteria”, as well as the fact that the Armed Forces of Ukraine protect democratic European principles from the arbitrariness of the Russian Federation, the early acceptance of Ukraine into the EU will contribute to defindlandization of the domestic political system and will significantly increase the morale of the military and the population, which forms the basis of the territorial defence of Ukraine and will make it impossible for the Russian troops to advance to other EU members.

To confirm this hypothesis, you can use the method of the opposite, if we assume that Ukraine will not be able to resist the aggression of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, then the latter, having received a new military bridgehead, will issue an ultimatum to Finlandization regarding membership in NATO to the countries that are already members of the EU – Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, etc. Thus, the Russian Federation will once again launch a military scenario of occupation of countries that do not agree to support the policy of Finlandization, and the algorithm of war that will spread throughout the European continent will be repeated cyclically. It follows from this that Ukraine’s membership in the EU will contribute to the defindlandization of Ukraine, but at the same time, it is worth realizing that Finland was included in the EU, in particular, because this country had a developed national economy.

Given the rapid course of events (1.04.–1.07.2022), which confirms H1, it is advisable to formulate the hypothesis H2 – after the end of the victorious war, an accelerated procedure for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and NATO will take place, or H3 – during the military operations around Ukraine, there will be a new military-economic union formed with Great Britain and neighbouring countries: Poland, Turkey, Moldova and Romania (as well as Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia).

In this context, we will analyse how the economic potential of Ukraine will change after the military aggression of the Russian Federation and identify the key vectors of the formation of a new economic policy for the first five post-war years (there is no doubt that Ukraine will win). If we talk about the resource potential of the country, which became one of the reasons for the start of the war (in particular, large reserves of zirconium and other minerals were found in Mariupol), then in the post-war period, when most enterprises and the corresponding infrastructure are destroyed, a key role in the recovery of Ukraine will be played by natural wealth of Ukraine, which will become a guarantor for investor countries.

Leading national specialists (M. Khvesyuk, I. Bystryakov, D. Klynovy, G. Obykhod, etc.) of the state institution “Insti-

Table 1

The main characteristics of the “defindlandization” policy of Ukraine

Protection		Changes in the country
sovereignty	democracy	intolerance to corruption
peace	solidarity	adaptation of the legislation
citizens of the country	tolerance	Modern Armed Forces and/or integration into a military alliance
freedom	the rule of law	absence of censorship
human rights, including minorities	the right to freely dispose of private property	national European integration values
the right to freely choose military alliances	territorial integrity	democratic and subsidized development principles

tute of Environmental Economics and Sustainable Development of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine” estimated the value of Ukraine’s natural wealth in the amount of UAH 1.06 trillion (land and mineral capital make up the lion’s share – 69.5 % [7]). On the basis of these data, we will present a territorial and sectoral breakdown of the value of the natural wealth of the regions of Ukraine in monetary terms in freely convertible currency – US dollars at the exchange rate of UAH 29 (Fig. 1).

Analysis of Fig. 1 explains the key reason why the Russian Federation showed military aggression and, first of all, unilaterally carried out the violent annexation (annexation) of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, since these regions, as well as the Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv and Kharkiv regions, have the highest natural value wealth among other regions of Ukraine.

It should be noted that the value of the natural wealth of Ukraine of UAH 1.06 trillion obtained in [7] is subject to further clarification since the normative value of agricultural land (which was used in the study) before the lifting of the Moratorium on the sale of such land differed significantly from the market value after the full launch of the land market. In our opinion, only 42 million agricultural lands (arable land, perennial crops, hayfields and pastures) in 2022–2027 will cost a total of about 150 billion US dollars, based on similar prices in neighbouring countries.

The idea is worth developing of a comparative assessment of the value of the natural wealth of Ukraine in gold equivalent, which allows calculating this indicator in monetary terms of about 1.06 trillion UAH, which according to calculations was worth more than 3.0 thousand tons of gold at market prices (1 ton of gold – approximately 33 million USD), and this is proved by the fact that “in terms of value, the natural wealth of Ukraine is equal to one-tenth of the world’s gold reserves in general” [7].

So, using the classical formula of the linear correlation of the value of natural wealth and gold, measured on the ratio scale in the period 2012–2022, using the Pearson correlation coefficient, we obtain

$$\frac{\sum_{i=12}^{22} p_i f_i}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=12}^{22} p_i^2}} \left(R_i \sum_{i=12}^{22} f_i^2 \right)^{-1} = 1, \quad (1)$$

where

$$p_i = (x_i - x_c); \quad f_i = (y_i - y_c); \quad i = 12, 13, 14, \dots, 22,$$

where x_i, y_i are respectively, the value of natural resources and gold from 2012 year to the 2022 year; x_c, y_c are average sample values of the value of natural wealth and gold for the selected period, when the value of gold significantly increased from 424 to 1834 UAH/gram.

Thus, in 10 years from 2012–2022, natural wealth will become the basic component of the resource potential of Ukraine in the post-war period and in monetary terms, its amount will be more than 4 trillion UAH while taking into account the high level of correlation $R_i = 0.8$ the following structure of the cost of the natural wealth of Ukraine will be preserved (Table 2).

Consequently, on the basis of the conducted research, it was established that as a result of the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the loss of the resource potential of the national economy of Ukraine in the monetary equivalent amounts to more than UAH 1.5 trillion, which in 2014 became an incentive to intensify the processes of continuing the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation regarding the seizure of part of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, and since 2022 – efforts to occupy the entire territory of Ukraine. According to our calculations, as of June 26, 2022, the decrease in the natural resource potential of Ukraine as a result of the Russian military attack on Ukraine is estimated at




Fig. 1. The value of the natural wealth of the regions of Ukraine in monetary terms in freely convertible currency (US dollars at the exchange rate of UAH 29) [7]

500 billion dollars and the total scale of destruction exceeds 1 trillion dollars. In particular, according to our calculations based on open data of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, demining the territories of Ukraine after the victory over the Russian-fascist invaders (Rashists) will require about 475 billion dollars to compensate for direct resource losses (not including environmental, social, moral and other consequences) (Fig. 2).

During the assessment of the total cost of losses of Ukraine (mainland part) from the Russian aggression in monetary terms (Fig. 2), data from open sources was used that the Russians significantly damaged almost 8,000 houses (1,000 houses were completely destroyed from below), the territory has been mined the size of an average European country (more than 90,000 sq. km), thousands of bombs have not exploded and

The structure of the value of the natural wealth of Ukraine in a territorial section [7]

Oblast/Index	Water resources	Land resources	Forest resources	Mineral resources	Ecosystem resources	Natural resources taking into account the emergency factor
Ukraine	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Autonomous Republic of Crimea (including the city of Sevastopol)	0.0286	0.0988	0.029	0.0211	0.052	0.0619
Vinnitsia Oblast	0.036	0.0364	0.036	0.0027	0.0215	0.0255
Volyn Oblast	0.035	0.017	0.0648	0.0006	0.0289	0.0199
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast	0.0304	0.0683	0.019	0.2657	0.0971	0.1155
Donetsk Oblast	0.014	0.0693	0.019	0.3156	0.0869	0.1256
Zhytomyr Oblast	0.0461	0.0309	0.106	0.0056	0.0259	0.0308
Transcarpathian Oblast	0.1044	0.0229	0.069	0.0027	0.0441	0.0303
Zaporizhzhia Oblast	0.0323	0.0278	0.011	0.0281	0.0217	0.0258
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast	0.0615	0.0226	0.062	0.0059	0.0238	0.0243
Kyiv Oblast (including the city of Kyiv)	0.1356	0.1279	0.065	0.0053	0.0563	0.0813
Kirovohrad Oblast	0.0171	0.0161	0.017	0.0116	0.0239	0.0164
Luhansk Oblast	0.0269	0.0423	0.031	0.2295	0.1235	0.1001
Lviv Oblast	0.0697	0.0577	0.065	0.0301	0.0661	0.0536
Mykolaiv Oblast	0.0239	0.0209	0.01	0.0029	0.0191	0.0155
Odesa Oblast	0.016	0.0591	0.021	0.0024	0.0346	0.0353
Poltava Oblast	0.0385	0.0563	0.026	0.0142	0.0387	0.0394
Rivne Oblast	0.0372	0.0208	0.077	0.0031	0.0287	0.0233
Sumy Oblast	0.0374	0.0244	0.044	0.0032	0.0205	0.0209
Ternopil Oblast	0.0256	0.0255	0.019	0.0009	0.0228	0.0185
Kharkiv Oblast	0.0307	0.0595	0.04	0.0213	0.0571	0.0462
Kherson Oblast	0.0288	0.014	0.012	0.0017	0.0146	0.0119
Khmelnyskiy Oblast	0.0319	0.0241	0.028	0.0033	0.0184	0.0188
Cherkasy region	0.0205	0.0138	0.033	0.0062	0.0136	0.0138
Chernivtsi Oblast	0.0172	0.0243	0.026	0.0023	0.0279	0.0191
Chernihiv Oblast	0.0547	0.0191	0.07	0.014	0.0325	0.0263

are in semi-working condition, hundreds of objects have been mined in the Black Sea, and some mines drift uncontrollably and pose a global danger. At the same time, the military, economic, environmental, socio-educational and ethnic-cultural losses of the state and population of Ukraine are not taken into account. In particular, we are talking about the bankruptcy of several enterprises, a significant drop in GDP, the destruction of historical monuments, a decrease in the level of education, science, innovative development, and the expenditure on ammunition, and military equipment, which in monetary terms is commensurate with the outlined resource losses of one and a half trillion US dollars.

The above indicates that the Russian Federation is not able to fully compensate even a part of the losses, since its




Fig. 2. Scheme for calculating the total cost of resource losses of Ukraine from Russian aggression in monetary terms (US dollars) [8, 9]

total GDP, even before the world sanctions, is less than the damage caused to the people of Ukraine. Therefore, in view of the fact that the Russian Federation violated all provisions of the Budapest Memorandum, in particular, by starting an armed conflict and threatening Ukraine to use nuclear weapons [2], it can be assumed that the reparations paid to us at the end of the war will cover up to 10 % of the necessary provision. In this context, it is worth minimally counting on these funds, except for frozen assets in Great Britain, the USA, Switzerland and other countries. But even here, Ukraine will not be the only one to claim the frozen assets of the Russian Federation. For example, the Irish leasing company, to which the Russian Federation did not return about a thousand aircraft and also claims frozen assets, estimated its losses at \$15 billion. Similar lawsuits may arise from most international companies (Renault, Volkswagen, Bosch, etc.) that operated on the territory of the Russian Federation, whose government plans not to return the property of these companies, nationalizing it.

Hence, it is worth waiting for the UN court decision, which will impose a seizure on the immobilized assets of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the volume of which is 3–4 annual GDPs of Ukraine. But for the money from reparations, financial aid, investments and preferential loans not to become “fish” for eating, but to turn into a “fishing rod” for the sustainable development of the national economy of Ukraine, integrated into the EU, it is necessary to accelerate the evolutionary transition from plan G. Morgenthau, who, with the support of W. Churchill, planned to make Germany an agrarian country, before the implementation of the innovative Marshall Plan, which had significant direct and indirect financial, economic and socio-cultural effects.

The conducted retrospective analysis indicates that, in financial terms, the Marshall Plan did not provide for significant financial injections relative to the GDP of each affected country (Fig. 3).

If we consider the absolute indicators, then the following countries received the largest financial investment: Great Britain (\$2.8 billion), France (\$2.4 billion), Italy and West Germany (\$1.3 billion), the Netherlands (\$0.9 billion), and the rest of the countries together received (\$1.7 billion). This proves that the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine after the end of the war can at best count on an irreversible financial injection in the amount of 5–15 % in relation to GDP.

The given facts, as well as the initiative of Switzerland, which was a catalyst in the process of approving the World Bank project “Government expenses for the preservation of administrative potential in Ukraine”, prove the feasibility of allocating almost 1.5 billion US dollars for the payment of salaries to government and social workers and clearly indicate the need definlandization of Ukraine. Otherwise, the Ukrainian economic system is doomed to repeat the history of Argentina, which had an insufficient pace of development after the Second World War.

Thus, the research conducted using the economic and mathematical apparatus SPSS Data Analysis Software made it possible to model typical scenarios of the recovery of the national economy of Ukraine in the context of its definlandization in separate directions: administrative, legal (judicial), self-governance, industrial and territorial (Table 3).

Conclusions and proposals. The outlined aspects of Ukraine’s post-war recovery should be financed independently to minimize the negative impact of the high level of shadow economy and corruption in the country. For this, it is not enough to be limited to financial assistance, but it is worth introducing targeted material assistance, which will be used for the restoration of infrastructure and regeneration of production. In particular, if the factories located there (Robert Bosch GmbH, Hitachi, Asus, Siemens, Schneider Electric, SKF,




Fig. 3. Distribution of financial aid according to the Marshall Plan (after World War II) in relation to the size of the gross domestic product, % [10]

Renault, BMW Group, Ford, Hyundai, MAN, Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen, Volvo Group, etc.) are moved from the territory of the Russian Federation.), then three strategic goals will be achieved at the same time.

First, in the case of uniform regional placement of production, about 50–120 thousand new high-paying jobs will be created in each region of Ukraine, which will completely solve the issue of unemployment and remigration of Ukrainians.

Secondly, tax revenues from the production and labour activities of the above-mentioned large enterprises will not only stabilize the State budget but will also contribute to the reduction of cash gaps in the Pension Fund of Ukraine, which according to the State Treasury Service of Ukraine at the beginning of 2022 amounted to almost 76 billion UAH.

Thirdly, the full cycle of production of cars, electronics and other goods will stimulate the activities of other branches

Table 3

The architecture of the post-war reconstruction of the infrastructure of Ukraine on the example of Donetsk Oblast [7–10]

Donetsk Oblast					
Urban territorial community			Rural territorial community		
Name of the community	The country that restores the area	Name of the community	The country that restores the area	Name of the community	The country that restores the area
Chasovoyarska	USA, Great Britain, Poland, Italy/Bakhmutskiy	Donetsk	Italy, Portugal/Kalmiysky	Shahivska	Italy/Bakhmutskiy
Toretska		Amvrosiivska		Cherkassy	Poland, Netherlands/Volnovaskiy
Soledarska		Novoazovsk		Khlibodariivska	
Siverska		Kalmiyska		Udachnenska	
Svitlodarska		Dokuchaevska		Staromlynivska	
Bakhmutska		Slavic		Starobeshivska	
Vuhledarska	Italy, France/Volnovaskiy	Sviatohirska	Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland/Kramatorsk	Sartanska*	Portugal/Kalmiysky
Volnovaska		Mykolaivska		Ocheretyivska*	
Shakhtarska	Netherlands, Poland, Austria/Horlivskiy	Lymanska	Poland, Switzerland, Italy/Pokrovsky	Olhynska*	Poland/Kramatorsk
Chistiakivska		Kramatorsk		Oleksandrivska	
Khrestivska		Kostiantynivska		Novodonetsk	
Snizhnianska		Druzhkivska		Nikolska	
Zhdanivska		Mariupolska		Myrnenska	
Yenakievka		Selydivska		Manhushska	
Debaltivska		Pokrovka		Kryvyi Rih	Italy, Bulgaria, Moldova/Mariupol
Horlivska		Novohrodivska		Komarska	
Vuhlehirska		Myrnohradka		Kalchytska	
Yasynuvatska		USA, Great Britain, Poland/Donetsk		Maryivska	Italy/Pokrovsky
Khartsyzka	Kurakhivska		Zvanivska		
Makiivska	Dobropilska		Hrodivska		
Ilovaisk	Bilozerska		Velykonovosilkivska		
			Boikivska		
			Andriivska		

of the national economy, and the country will export not only resources but also goods with high added value.

Fourthly, the successful geographical location of production facilities on the territory of Ukraine will make it possible after the end of the war to restore all sales markets that existed before the war, which will contribute to accelerated economic growth and obtaining excess profits.

Thus, the article offers a clear structure of the laws of construction of the “Marshall Plan” and the proposed method of highly specialized recovery of Ukraine is built on the principles of decentralization, subsidiarity and proportional responsibility primarily of the guarantor countries of the Budapest Memorandum, as well as all EU countries and UN members. The study unequivocally points to the need for the defindlandization of Ukraine and the further development of public administration on the global legislative basis of self-organization, the creation of international consortia for the restoration of cosmonautics (rocket construction), aircraft construction, shipbuilding, and other branches of the national economy. In order to overcome corruption, it is worth completing the successfully started project of complete digitization of most services through the Diya application using modern protection technologies, in particular Blockchain.

Acknowledgements. *The article was written within the framework of the Long-term program to support Ukrainian research teams (Polish Academy of Sciences) as well as a research internship at Marie Curie-Skłodowska University (UMCS).*

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Дефінляндизація та нова економічна політика України у повоєнний період

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Мета. Дослідити генезис і ключові історичні аспекти, що призвели до популяризації в науковій літературі поняття «дефінляндизація», а також вказати стратегічні пріоритети формування «Плану Маршала» в рамках можливо військово-економічного союзу між Великою Британією, Україною, Польщею та прибалтійськими країнами. Запропонувати оптимальні шляхи нейтралізації економічних загроз і визначити ймовірні сценарії післявоєнної відбудови інфраструктури національної економіки України.

Методика. У роботі використана комбінація кореляційного та SWOT-аналізу, що уможливило проведення розрахунків вартості природного багатства в повоєнний період на основі програмного засобу SPSS Data Analysis Software. Використані економіко-математичні методи уможливили формування алгоритму розрахунку вартості відновлення загальних ресурсних втрат України від російської агресії у грошовому еквіваленті та встановити взаємно однозначні кореляційні зв'язки з вартістю золота, використовуючи критерій Пірсона.

Результати. Авторами систематизовано спектр факторів, що впливають на ВВП у повоєнний період і визначено орієнтовний розмір необхідних ресурсів для повоєнного перезапуску національної економіки України. Уперше науково доведена необхідність відмови від політики фінляндизації, оскільки внутрішніх ресурсів і коштів від репарацій не буде достатньо для сталого розвитку України. Встановлено, що основною гарантією інвестування в українську економіку є висока вартість природних багатств в усіх регіонах України, яка оцінюється у грошовому еквіваленті приблизно 4 трлн. грн, і наведено інноваційну Архітектоніку повоєнного відновлення інфраструктури України.

Наукова новизна. Використані аналітико-математичні методи уможливили встановлення кореляційних зв'язків у регіональному розподілі вартості різних типів природного багатства. На відміну від існуючих досліджень, у даній роботі не лише об'єктивно визначений розмір втрат у грошовому еквіваленті, але й запропоновані конкретні шляхи їх компенсації в контексті формування нової економічної політики дефінляндизації України на основі економіко-математичного моделювання типових сценаріїв відновлення національної економіки.

Практична значимість. Проведене дослідження потенційних шляхів дефінляндизації національної економіки було надане для вивчення до Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2022, Лугано, Швейцарія). Зокрема, авторами обґрунтована економічна доцільність переміщення з території РФ європейських виробничих потужностей (Robert Bosch GmbH, Siemens, Schneider Electric, SKF, Renault, BMW Group, Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen, Volvo Group, та ін.), що сприятиме рееміграції українців та прискореному розвитку України на принципах децентралізації, субсидиарності й дефінляндизації.

Ключові слова: дефінляндизація, воєнний стан в Україні, повоєнні наслідки, економічна оцінка втрат, нова економічна політика

The manuscript was submitted 23.08.22.